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A jural relation has been elsewhere defined as a situation of legal
and material fact upon which one by his own will may restrict or claim
to restrict, presently or contingently, with the aid of the law, freedom
of action of another.'
There are two.major types of jural relation and two sub-types. The
major types are "claim" and "power" and the sub-types are "immunity"
and "privilege." A claim relation Is where one may effectively (i. e.
with the aid of the law) require an act; an immunity relation is where
one may effectively repel an act; a privilege relation is where one may
effectively decline an act; and a power relation is where one may act
effectively toward another. An essential element of legal relations
(juris -nexus) and of legal rules is constraint based on legal sanctions,
whether of nullity, punishment or other physical coercion, liabilities, or
the imposition of new duties. Without constraint there can be neither
jural relation in a strict sense nor a legal rule. All else is non-jural
and non-legal.
It is sometimes urged that any fact which comes within the scope of
* EThis article was submitted by Professor Kocourek at the -?equest of the
editors. Several other articles along the same lines have been published by him
during the past year in (1920) 15 ILL. L. Ray. 24, (I920) 2o CoL. L. Rnv. 394,
(192o) 68 PA. L. REV. 322, (i92o) ig MICH. L. REv. 47, (192o) 15 Ii. L. Rnv. 347.
*rhese should all be read in order to get the full force of Professor Kocourek's
analysis and terminology. Certain of his differences with the conclusions of
Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld [as stated in the latter's articles on Some Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913) :3 YALE LAw
JourazAL, i6. and (x97) 26 id. 7,o (published in pamphlet form, igig)] are
considered in the immediately succeeding article by Professor Corbin in this
number.-ED.]




adjudication necessarily is of a legal nature. Thus, it has been sup-
posed that the lack of power in X, a stranger to a title, to convey it, is
a legal immunity in 0, the owner of the title, and that, therefore, X and
O are in a legal relation (nexus) to each other as to the specific act in
question (i. e. an attempted transfer of the title) ; since, if the matter
should be judicially presented, it would be determined that X had no
power to affect the interests of the true owner. 2 Barring any question
of slander of title, the illustration does not exhibit a jural situation in a
strict sense. There is not involved in it, at any point, the element of
legally restrained conduct. An attempted conveyance by a stranger
to a title (apart from slander of title or cloud) is a simple nullity, and
the situation is without legal significance. It may readily be admitted
that a determination of the fact of the lack of power may be practically
important, but this importance is not different from the determination,
in the course of litigation, of the negative of any other mere assertion
of legal relation.
The negative declaratory judgment is also instanced as an example
of a jural relation not involving constraint.3 This illustration is anal-
ogous and is supported or falls by the same reasoning. The negative
declaratory judgment is, in effect, simply a reversal of the ordinary pro-
cedure.4 While, in the usual procedure, the asserter of a legal relation
sues, in the negative declaratory judgment procedure, the denier of the
claimed relation begins the offensive. Where the asserter fails in his
action, and where the denier succeeds, the result is precisely the same.
The judgment is "no-claim" or "no-right" in each case. But the cir-
cumstance that a court has adjudicated such a negative, while it
demonstrates that a legal operation has been performed and thlat prac-
tical issues have been settled, does not warrant .the belief that any
legal relation between the parties existed prior to the litigation, at least
in the case of an ordinary action at law.
The qualification is necessary. The declaratory judgment procedure
is a step in advance not only in procedural reform, but also in juristic
contemplation. Where, in the absence of the declaratory judgment
procedure, the making of an unfounded claim before an action is com-
menced, is not in any way noticed by the law, and, therefore, has no
legal significance either in what is claimed or in the actual fact (no-
claim), in the declaratory judgment procedure the mere assertion of a
no-claim as a claim, is sufficient to set in motion procedural action to
establish the negative. In the latter case, a jural situation exists
prior to suit, in this, that there is legally restrained conduct; the as-
2Cf. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (I919) 6o, 96.
*Cf. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment (xgi8) 28 YALE LAw JouRNAL,
x, 9, ioS; see also by the same author, COMMrNTS (I920) 29 id. 545.
'Prof. Borchard admits this: "strictly speaking, judgments dismissing a
complaint are declaratory in their nature." (i9g8) 28 id. 5, note 12.
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serter being under a negative duty not to make an unfounded claim, the
sanction of which duty is a liability to be proceeded against in a declara-
tory action. In the ordinary procedure, there is neither duty nor lia-
bility in the making of an unfounded claim prior to litigation; but
juristic analysis requires that the commencement of a suit on an un-
founded claim be considered a breach of duty, the sanction of which
is nullity of the action, and, in the judgment for the defendant, the
creation of a new duty not to recommence the suit (res judicata). In
the one case (ordinary procedure) the making of an unfounded claim
has no legal significance, but there is a legal duty not to bring suit; in
the other case (declaratory procedure) there is a duty not to make an
unfounded claim.
The four types of jural relation above enumerated represent the
four exclusive, legal types of motion in jural acts considered with




PASSIVE A] IMMUNITY 
B Active
A] PRIVILEGE B Passive
ACTIVE A -OWR
[A is the dorninus and B the servus of the jural relation. The ar-
rows indicate the direction of the act. The brackets mean that the act
can be obstructed. When a jural relation is active or passive from the
standpoint of the dominus, it is passive or active, respectively, from the
standpoint of the servus. But since the relation is always controlled by
the dominus, it will be convenient to speak of jural relations as 'active'
or 'passive' from the standpoint of the dominus.]
Examples of each of the foregoing relations are as follows: claim,
the "right" of the holder of a note to have payment; immunity,
"right" of a juror to be free from arrest; privilege, "right" to make
privileged communication; power, "right" of pledgee to sell his
security.
Each of the four enumerated jural terms has a correlative as shown
in the following table:
TABLE II
JURAL CORRELATIVES
CLAIM IMMUNITY PRIVILEGE POWER
DUTY DISABILITY INABILITY LIABILITY
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For practical advantage, it is unnecessary to dichotomize jural rela-
tions, since there are only two generic types which can never be juris-
tically confused, viz., claims and powers. Capability to require with
legal effect an act from another would not be mistaken for a capacity
to act with legal effect toward another. But it is possible that a power
whether growing out of a jural relation or not, might be confused
with the non-jural concept of liberty (the capability to act without
legal consequences). For example, performance by one of the parties,
of an unenforceable contract, might raise a difficulty of choice whether
the act of performance is one of liberty or of power.5 But, even here,
dichotomy is not practically useful, since the series is already exhausted
by the first step of division. Therefore, a table of negatives (contra-
dictories) probably serves no direct or important practical purpose in
legal analysis.8
If it is considered desirable for any juristic purpose to construct a
table of jural contradictories, some discrimination will be necessary in
observing various types of negation not considered in the usual text-
book on logic.
For example, if a concrete but yet unknown idea is under investiga-
tion, we may say of it, (i) that it is jural or non-jural; (2) if jural,
that it involves a dominant, active relation (where the dominus of the
relation acts toward another) or a dominant passive relation (where
There are cases where "power" acts and "liberty" acts coincide (e. g. destruc-
tion or consumption by the owner, of his chattel, but the jural aspect of these
instances is relatively unimportant and they may be ignored for practical purposes.
In all other cases it is unnecessary and inconvenient, if not even incorrect, to
speak of the exercise of a power as a "liberty." Thus Professor Hohfeld,
speaking of the "right of entry" (Hohfeld, op. cit. note 2, at p. 55), says that the
grantor has "(i) the privilege [liberty] of entering, and (2) the power, by means
of such entry, to divest the title of the grantee." For a further criticism of this
usage, see Kocourek, The Hohfeld System (192o) I5 Ilu. L. REV. 24, 27 a. Pro-
fessor Hohfeld instanced still another case which raises the same question (Hoh-
feld, op. cit. note 2, at p. 39) : "If ... X has contracted with Y to go on the
former's own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege
[liberty] of entering and the duty of entering." In answer to this it may be said
that it is difficult to see how X has juristically a liberty to do what he is com-
pelled to do. Choice is of the very essence of liberty. If all the doors are closed
but one and X is commanded to go through that, X's liberty can be declared
only in a Pickwickian sense.
In lawyers' parlance and in colloquial speech rights in the strict sense are not
infrequently spoken of as if they were susceptible of being exercised. This
occurs in cases of rights in personam involving repeated performance. Thus a
landlord may be said to be exercising his right of collecting his rents. It occurs
more frequently where repeated possessory acts are performed in the enjoyment
of rights in land of others. Thus, it is said the dominant tenant exercises his
servitude or right of way. See for a judicial illustration, (i8go) I Exr. D. RG.
101.
'Cf. Kocourek, op. cit., (i52o) is ILL. L. REv. 24, 28b.
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the dominus controls the act of another toward himself); (3) if
active, that the dominant or the servient side of the relation is in qties-
tion; (4) if the dominant side is represented, that it is a power or a
privilege. This is typically, for jural ideas, the process 6f exhaustive
division in accordance with the logical rule, divisio non faciat saltum.
If however, the process of negation is begun, not from the highest
genus downward, but from a negation of a given jural concept, we en-
counter first of all two types of negation: general, and specific. Thus,
in the negation of power, we get "no-power." No-power as a "general
negative" of power may mean, in addition to "inability," any one of
the six remaining fundamental jural ideas--claim, duty, immunity, dis-
ability, privilege, liability. While a general negative does not exhibit
any of its qualities in advance, a "specific negative" already shows its
specific character. Thus, no-power as the specific negative of power
extended into its full meaning, signifies "disability" as a correlative of
"immunity," since no-power, in this specific sense, shows that it belongs
to the passive group of jural relations (where the act is under control
of another as dominus) and in which the quality of the relation is such
that one acting is under an incapability which at once fixes its position
according to Table I, supra.
Again, it is necessary in the use of negatives to discriminate between
those which are ultimate and intermediate. An ultimate negative is
one which is not further reducible, and which, in denying the existence
of a given jural relation, excludes the possibility of any other.
The following table (p. 22o) shows the correlatives systematically
























[The general negatives distinguished by an asterisk indicate those
which may be ultimate.]
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So far as this table may be thought to have any importance for indi-
cating the various forms of jural negatives, for indicating the termin-
ology which is applicable to these forms, or as a basis for legal analysis,
it may not be unprofitable before leaving this topic, to show by another
illustration how the specific negatives are obtained. 7 Taking for the
illustration, the first combination of correlatives, claim-duty, we have
no difficulty in understanding that no-claim and no-duty are respectively
the general negative correlatives. These terms may be either ultimate
or intermediate. As ultimate terms, no-claim and no-duty contradict
the jural relation posited (claim-duty) and exclude the possibility of
any other jural relation. The usual "judgment for defendant" finding
is a general, ultimate negative. If, however, the terms no-claim and
no-duty are not ultimate, but are only intermediate negatives, it is then
necessary to state the specific negatives. While the solution is perhaps
not always superficially apparent, yet the specific negative, as the name
implies, is predetermined.
The term claim (Table I) is a dominant passive concept (i. e., it in-
volves capability in the dominus of the relation to control the acts of
another toward the dominus). The negative of claim (no-claim) ex-
tended into a paraphrase, meanA: no-capability to control the act of
another toward oneself. This implies an existing jural relation of
which another is dominus. Since the concept posited was a dominant
passive one, the negative concept must be a, servient passive one, and
the specific relation, therefore, must be one of privilege or of power in
another person as dominus. The real difficulty of the problem is now
encountered. What governs the choice between privilege and power?
In both cases, there is a lack of capability to control the act of another.
A re-examination of the paraphrase becomes necessary. Claim means,
as we have seen, a capability to require with legal effect an act from
another. The negation of this is lack of capability to require an act
from another. The connotation, therefore, is inability rather than lia-
"In the celebrated essays on jural relations of Professor Hohfeld there is
set forth (Hohfeld, op. cit. note 2, at pp. 36, 65) a table called Jural Opposites,
as follows:
( Right Duty Power ImmunityJUaAi. OpIosrrs No-Right Privilege Disability Liability
An effort has been made elsewhere to show that what Professor Hohfeld
probably intended to outline was not a table of opposites in the sense of logic,
but a table of negatives (contradictories); see Kocourek, op. cit. (120) I5 ILL.
L. Rav. 24, 27 ff.
The other two terms privilege and immunity cannot be conveniently discussed
here in comparison with Table III, supra, for the reasons that privilege, so far
as it is'the synonym for liberty, is entirely excluded-here as not possessing any
jural character, and that immunity (non-subjection to power) is used in a
radically different sense in this discussion (see Table I, supra).
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bility and we accordingly reach the conclusion that the specific nega-
tive of claim is inability as the correlative of privilege. Since claim
and privilege and immunity and power, respectively, are negatives,
8
no difficulty will be met in arriving at the specific negatives of other
jural concepts:
The jural idea just analyzed may be illustrated by the so-called
"right" of deviation. Ordinarily, the owner of land may require others
to keep off his land. In juristic language, the owner has a claim which
is correlative to a duty, the content of which is a negative act, viz., to
kedp off the owner's land. But in exceptional cases, a traveler on an
obstructed highway may deviate onto adjacent private land. In juristic
language, the traveler has the privilege of declining the negative act,
and the owner of the land is under an inability to require the negative
act. It will be observed here that the locution of practical speech is
metonymic. When we say that the traveler has the privilege of
deviating onto the land of another what is mant is, as already shown,
the capability to decline a negative act which is expressed in a positive
act, i. e., the power of entering.
The same result is reached by the same process when proceeding
from a servient concept. Thus, in determining the specific negative
of duty, we find that duty is a servient, active concept. The negative,
therefore, is a dominant, active concept which must be either privilege
or power, and since duty involves legal compulsion to act toward
another, the specific negative (i. e., no legal compulsion to act toward
another) clearly indicates a privilege.
A table of these forms of negation follows:
TABLE IV
FORMS OF JURAL NEGATIVES
NEGATIVES CORRELATIVES NEGATIVES
SERV. PASS. DOM. PASS. CLAIM. DUTY SERV. 
ACT. DOM. ACT.
SERW. PASS. DOM. PASS. IMMUNITY DISABILITY SERV. 
ACT. DOM. ACT.
SERV. ACT. DOM. ACT. PRIVILEGE INABILITY 
SERV. PASS. DOM. PASS.
SERV. ACT. DOM. ACT. POWER LIABILITY 
SERV. PASS. DOM. PASS.
8 Negative or contradictory means that when two given persons are nexus, a
given act either can be required by one from the other (claim), or that it
cannot be required by one from the other (privilege); or that a given act either
can be done effectively by one against the other (power), or that it cannot be
done effectively by one against the other (immunity).
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Up to this point we have discussed only jural relations in the strict
sense, i. e., those situations where one person, the dominus, may con-
trol with legal effect (i. e., with the aid of the law), the conduct of
another, the servus. We now proceed to consider a series of situations
which resemble jural relations in the strict sense, and which for various
purposes are recognized by the law, but which differ from strict jural
relations in the lack of a capability of legal constraint in the dominus
of the situation over another. We may avoid, for the present, giving
these quasi-jural relations a distinctive name, but it will be convenient
to distinguish the species of jural relations by the qualification "nexal"
and the species of quasi-jural relations by the qualification "simple."
Thus, we will have a series of quasi-jural relations (simple claim, sim-
ple immunity, simple privilege, and simple power) in contrast with the
series of jural relations (nexal claim, nexal immunity, nexal privilege,
nexal power.)
Simple Claim. If a contract is made which unnecessarily restrains
trade, but which does not involve an illegal act, the party whose conduct
is unduly restrained may perform if he chooses.9 The claim against
him to perform cannot be made effective by legal coercion. It is
defective for excessiveness, and it is accordingly reduced to the level of
a simple claim.
A claim unenforceable because of the bar of the statute of limitations
or the statute of frauds is also a simple claim. Claims of this kind are
sometimes classified as imperfect nexal claims,' 0 but since the funda-
mental basis of a nexal claim is the power of constraint, it is a contradic-
tion to say that an act can be constrained which can be effectually
avoided."' That the debtor of a simple claim does not plead the statute
if sued, does not change the nature of the claim.
Likewise all legal transactions invalid for incapacity, informality,
frat~d, duress, misrepresentation, mistake, want of consideration, or any
cause short of illegality, create simple claims."2 In order that a claim
may be denominated a simple claim, it must at least assimilate in its
inception the form of a nexal claim. If A, who had at no time any
kind of dealing with B, should claim from him, let us say, a gratuity,
or payment for services never rendered or contracted for, such a de-
mand would be neither a nexal nor a simple claim.
The question here suggests itself whether a claim; perfect in form,
as presented, but invalid in substance because of a defense for the
present undisclosed (b. g., claim for payment when satisfaction has
'Brunswick v. Grossman (ig2o, Ill. App.) 15 Iu.. L. REv.-App. Ct. Dig. 34.1 E. g., Salmond, Jurisprudence (3d ed. I9io) 2oi, sec. 78.
Cf. 1 Windscheid, Pandekten (gth ed. I9O6) see. I12, esp. note 5.
A basis for this distinction may be found in the function of the ezceptio in
Roman law: cf. 2 Cuq, Les institutes juridiques des Romains (x9o8) 714;
Salkowski, Institutionen (9th ed. I9o7) io3, 582.
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already been made) is to be regarded as a nexal or a simple claim.
The answer would seem to be, that for the present, it is to be regarded
as a nexal claim, but that when all the facts are disclosed, it is reduced
to the level of a naked claim and not merely a simple claim, since
although in its inception it may have been a nexal claim, it has been
entirely dissolved by an act which the law considers legally sufficient
(e. g., payment). Lapse of time, however, may reduce a nexal claim
to the level of a simple claim. Likewise, by subsequent acts, a simple
claim may become elevated to a nexal claim.
Simple Immunity."8 A simple immunity is presented where one with
a title of right (claim or power) or other legal advantage is secure in
his title against the hostile act of another. The illustration above dis-
cussed is in point where the title of a land-owner cannot be divested by
a stranger to the title. It is a situation where one cannot be affected
in his legal advantages by an assertion of power in another. This as-
sertion of power may or may not be accompanied by a duty. If there
is a duty resting on the asserter of the power, the owner of the title is
the dominus also of a nexal claim.
A procedural illustration of a simple immunity is where an action is
commenced on an unfounded claim, or where a second action is begun
after a prior judgment for the defendant. The immunity is against the
maintenance of the action but not against its institution which is a sim-
ple power. (See Simple Power, infra.)
Simple Privilege."4 Simple privilege may be illustrated by the act
of a servant dealing within the contractual scope of his employment
with the property of his master. If the employment is coupled with
an interest, the nexal categories are involved.
It may be observed in this connection that license is not a simple,
but a nexal, privilege. The connection between contract of employ-
ment and license, in its application to the physical use of property, has
some external similarities, but juristically they represent different con-
cepts. Both may be terminated at the will of the principal or licensor,
as the case may be, but there is an essential difference, in this, that a
license results in a restriction of freedom of action, to whatever extent
it is exercised, of the licensor, while acts of agency are in furtherance
of the principal's freedom of action. Accordingly, license is nexl-
a legally effective limitation of the freedom of action of another until
U It needs to be observed that the immunity here classified as simple is regarded
as a major concept by the Hohfeld school: Hohfeld, op. cit. note 2, at pp. 5, 6D,
et passim; cf. the criticism in Kocourek, op. cit. (192o) z5 ILu L. R!v. 24, 34,
note 3.
"The term privilege is also employed by the Hohfeld school as a major legal
concept, usually in the sense of liberty which entirely lacks any nexal character,
and sometimes, as it seems to us, in the sense of nexal power. Hohfeld, op. cit.
note 2, at pp. 5, 38, et passim; cf. the criticism in Kocourek, op. cit. (,92o) x5
Irx.. L. REV. 24, 32 ff. Since the concept liberty lacks duality, it is accordingly
here excluded from representation either as a nexal or as a simple relation.
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it is revoked; while acts of agency in relation to the principal are non-
nexal-they do not constrain the principal.15 It may be argued that
since the licensor has freely granted the license and has it within his
power to terminate it at any moment, it is contradictory to assert his
restraint. The reply is that a nexal claim under a contract is subject
to the same conditions. It is created freely and it may as freely be
abrogated. The further reply is that the intermediate period between
grant and revocation is actually under the control of the licensee.16 It
must be acknowledged, however, that some forms of license, as treated
by the courts, probably must be classified under simple privilege.
Simple Power. A simple power relation exists where one may act
with legal consequences (in contradistinction to legal effect-), but where
the law does not give effect to the act for the advantage of power-
holder. A simple power may or may not be accompanied by a nexal
duty not to act. Thus in making an offer, there is no accompanying
duty to make or not make the offer. But in the violation of a con-
tract or in the commission of a tort, there is an accompanying nexal
duty, the violation of which creates a new nexal relation. The power
of an agent to bind his principal in a contractual or a delictual obliga-
tion is probably also to be classified as a simple power, since the will
of the agent, or, at any rate his capability, is derived from the principal,
in the sense that it is conferred by the principal or proceeds from the
institution of the agent as agent.
Each of the above categories has a simple correlative-simple duty,
simple disability, simple inability, simple liability. They do not require
separate discussion; but it may be noted that the categories of quasi-
jural relations also exhibit the internal cross-connections which may be
found in strict jural relations-reciprocals, negatives, contraries, and
sub-contraries.17  One illustration may be given. Suppose that B,
not standing in any jural relation to A, demands of him a sum of money
on a fictitious claim. A as the dominus of this non-jural relation may
decline the act demanded. It will be seen (Table III, supra) that A's
simple privilege has as its general, intermediate, negative correlative,
the no-claim of B and as its specific (positive) correlative, the inability
of B to make his demand effective.' 8
However, in addition to the intrinsic difference between jural and
quasi-jural relations, another important distinction may be pointed out.
" Of course, in dealings with third persons the agent acts with a capability of
power (i. e., the power to create, or divest legal relations between the principal
and third persons), but that situation is tiot now in discussion. See Hohfeld,
op. cit. ncte 2, at pp. 38, 52.
" In the Hohfeld system license is a generic term to indicate a group of
operative facts required to create a particular privilege: Hohfeld, op. cit. note 2,
at p. 5o. The present writer has elsewhere expressed his dissent: Kocourek,
op. cit. (1920) 15 ILL. L. REv. 24, 32.
' These internal connections are discussed in another article in (i92o) i9 MIcH.
L. Rav. 47.
TABULAE MINORES JURISPRUDENTIAE
In jural relations one major concept (claim or power) or its reciprocal
(immunity and privilege, respectively) can not overlap with the other
major concept or its reciprocal."9 In other words, what is claim or
immunity in one can not be power or privilege in another, nor can power
or privilege in one be claim or immunity in another. But in quasi-
jural relations this possibility is not excluded. One person may have a
simple claim to an act, while another may have a simple privilege with
respect to the same act. For example if A has a simple claim against
B (e. g., under contract entered into through fraud of A), B owes a
simple duty, but B likewise has a simple privilege of declining per-
formance. If, on the contrary, A had a nexal claim correlated by a
nexal duty of B, B clearly would not have a nexal privilege of declining
performance.
Whether the terminology here proposed be accepted or not, it is clear
that the relations themselves to which this terminology is applied, exist,
and that they need a form of verbal expression.
2 0
The negatives and correlatives both of jural and quasi-jural immunity and
privilege have precisely the same arrangement here (Table III, supra) as in the
tables published by Professor Hohfeld: (913) 23 YALE LAW JouRNAL, I6.
In view of this coincidence, the credit for which belongs entirely to Professor
Hohfeld by virtue of undeniable priority of formulation, the present writer may
be permitted to state that the attempt here made to work out a -table of quasi-
jural relations, while independently justifiable by the necessities of a defective
juristic terminology, was primarily undertaken in deference to the views of
Professor Hohfeld and of those who have adopted his system. The criticisms
heretofore ventured [Kocourek, op. cit. (i92o) 5 ILL. L. REv. 24] of the use of
the terms immunity and privilege wholly disappear if these terms are placed in a
table, as here suggested, of quasi-jural relations, and if, furthermore, the term
privilege is narrowed to exclude the idea of liberty which lacks the bilateral
quality necessary when speaking of a legal relation whether simple or nexal.
In this way the integral character of the Hohfeld system may, we believe, be
preserved.
"Claim and immunity are subalternates or reciprocals; as are also power
and privilege. Disregard of these juristic functions may account for the tables
formulated by Professor Hohfeld. Ne saw that in legal relations there were
two kinds of cases: one where X could -require an act from Y (claim); another,
where X could act against Y (power). Against each of these terms he placed
a negative: (a) where X could not require an act from Y, Y became the
dominus and X the servus (privilege-no-right); (b) where X could not act
against Y, Y became the dominus and X the serv.us (immunity--disability).
Had Professor Hohfeld adverted to the compulsory character of jural relations
and made privilege not a mere negation of claim but a reciprocal of power, and
immunity not a mere negation of -power but a reciprocal of claim, doubtless he
would have reached the same conclusions as are advanced here. Yet, as shown
above, Professor Hohfeld's employment of the terms immunity and privilege
may be usefully capitalized without destroying the product of his labor.
" It is the great merit of the late Professor Hohfeld to have insisted in a very
effective and thorough-going way-and the law is his debtor for it-upon the
necessity for an adequate juristic terminology. Sound terminology has the
same advantage for the practical administration of justice as a sound logic,
without the dangers to which formal logic sometimes leads when pressed too
far. Cf. (1889) I BORG. RECHT, 240, sec. 8.
